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I Vol. I

THE STATUS OF "HOME RULE" IN GEORGIA
The archaic system of special bills to provide for the
local government of cities and counties, which had its inception in this country when the colonies asserted their independence,' has long been under fire as not only cumbersome
but also contrary to tradition and the intention of those
who formed our state governments.2 The opponents of this
system offered in its stead local government of municipalities by a system commonly referred to as "Home Rule." Although this system has not had success commensurate with
the glossy pictures painted by its more avid proponents, it
has, where accepted, attained the aims of its more practical
supporters by placing the reins of government closer to
those directly concerned. The form of the municipal gov'ernmet has been shaped to fit the peculiar needs of the
community, thereby simplifying the governmental machinery
and allowing prompt action in dealing with local problems.
In addition to these advantages, the system has relieved the
state legislature of a tremendous load of special legislation
and has removed the temptation to interfere in local affairs
on the basis of partisan politics or at the behest of local
pressure groups.'
Although the trend toward Home Rule reached its apex
in the late twenties, it is still proceeding. The convention
which drafted the 1945 Constitution of Georgia sensed the
need to relieve the legislature of a portion of its overload,
and included in the Constitution a mandate to the legislature
to provide uniform systems of county and municipal governments.4 Acting expressly in obedience to this mandate, the
1947 session of the General Assembly enacted the "Municipal Home Rule Law of 1947 . ' " Feeling that this act failed to
attain the desired result and feeling that it also failed to
answer the Constitutional mandate, the lower house of the
1. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 445,446 (Rev. ed. 1899).
2. I MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 265 (2d ed. 1940).
3. Id. at 277, 278.
4. GA. CONST. Art. XV, § 1, GA. CODE ANN. § 2-8301 (1946 Rev.).
5. Ga. Laws 1947, No. 290, p. 1118, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 69-1001 et seq.
(Supp. 1947).
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General Assembly passed another Home Rule bill in 1949
designed to cure these defects.' This bill was rejected by the
Senate in the 195o extended session of the legislature.
I.
The "Municipal Home Rule Law of 1947" contains a list
of i 6 counties to which it shall apply,8 one of which is
elsewhere expressly removed from its application? Of the
remaining 43 counties two are expressly exempt ° and the
others are covered by a provision rendering the Act "...
ipso facto of no further force and effect just as if it had been
repealed in its entirety . . ." if it is in anyway extended to
cover counties previously excluded. 1' At the most, this effort
of the General Assembly can hardly be called more than a
failure, and it is generally conceded to be an unconstitutional failure at that. This idea exists because the Act contains
within it special legislation12 and because it brazenly violated both the letter and the spirit of the Constitution by failing to provide a uniform system of municipal government.
The bill killed by the Senate during the 195o extended session"' of the Legislature seems to be the future Home Rule
Law of Georgia, and for that reason will be compared with
the present law.
Both the 1947 Act and the proposed bill provide that
original charters may be granted only by the General Assembly, but neither requires the charter drafted by the
municipality under the Act to be approved by the Assembly. The general tenor of the two is that although the
6. H. B. 25, 1949 Session, General Assembly of Georgia.
7. Ga. Laws 1947, No. 290, p. 1118, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 69-1001 et seq.
(Supp. 1947).
8. Ga. Laws 1947, No. 290, § 10, p. 1129.
9. Ga. Laws 1947, No. 290, § 10, p. 1130.
10. Ga. Laws 1947, No. 290, § 10, p. 1129.
11. Ga. Laws 1947, No. 290, § 11, p. 1120.
12. Ga. Laws 1947, No. 290, § 3 (2), p. 1123; Ga. Laws 1947, No. 290,
§ 10, p. 1129; Ga. Laws 1947, No. 290, § 10, p. 1130.
13. Ga. Laws 1947, No. 290, p. 1118, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 69-1001 et. seq.
(Supp. 1947).
14. Ga. Laws 1947, No. 290, § 2, p. 1119; H. B. 25, § 2.
15. Ga. Laws 1947, No. 290, § 3 (e), pp. 1120, 1121; H. B. 25 § 3 (e).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. I

General Assembly is the only power that can incorporate
a municipality, once incorporation takes place the charter
may be shed and a new one drafted under Home Rule.16
This leaves the General Assembly with the power to veto
incorporation but without the power to set conditions for
incorporation. The General Assembly may have intended
that the charter under Home Rule be submitted to it for
approval, as has been provided by other statutes" and as
was done by Marietta, Georgia, 8 but such an intention is
contrary to the express words of the Act, and any benefit
achieved thereby could be defeated by the amending
process.1

The 1947 Act and the proposed bill both provide alternate methods for calling an election to determine the question of whether a commission shall be appointed to draft a
charter." The question may be submitted either by ordinance
of the governing body of the municipality or a petition
filed with the city clerk or similar official. If the latter
method is used, the 1947 Act requires that the petition to
be operative must be signed by at least 25% of the voters
qualified to participate in the last general election. The
proposed bill reduces the required number of signatures
from

25%

to 20% and changes the term "last general elec-

tion" to "last general city election" to remove any possible
confusion. Under either statute, the election of commissioners to draft the charter takes place at the same time as
the election to determine whether a commission shall be selected." This, along with other provisions, 2 is obviously designed both to expedite the procedure and to minimize the
expense. If the vote is favorable, the seven candidates for
16. Ga. Laws 1947, No. 290, § 3, p. 1119; H. B. 25 § 3.
17. See City of Sapulpa v. Land, 101 Okla. 22, 223 Pac. 640, 35 A.L.R.
872 (1924).
18. Ga. Laws 1949, No. 58, p. 238.
19. See Denver v. New York Trust Co., 229 U.S. 123, 33 S. Ct. 657, 57
L. Ed. 1101 (1913).
20. Ga. Laws 1947, No. 290, §§ 3(a), 3(b), pp. 1119, 1120; H. B. 25, §§
3 (a), 3 (b).
21. Ga. Laws 1947, No. 290, §§ 3 (c), 3 (d), p. 1120; H.B. 25, §§ 3 (c),
3 (d).
22. Ga. Laws 1947, No. 290, §§ 3 (e), 3 (b), 3 (k), 3a, 5, pp. 1120,
1121, 1123, 1124, 1126; H.B. 25, §§ 3 (e), 3(h), 5.
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commissioner receiving the highest number of votes proceed
to draft a charter to be submitted to the governing authority of the municipality within ninety days. 3 All necessary
expenses of the commission are paid by the municipality,
but the commissioners receive no compensation for their
services .-The charter is submitted to the electorate of the
municipality at a special election between sixty and ninety
days from the time of the commission's report, unless a
general election comes within that time, in which case the
charter is voted on at the general election. Where alternate
sections are offered, the one receiving the highest vote is
adopted. If the charter is approved, it goes into effect at
the time specified therein and supersedes the existing charter and all amendments to it. An alternate method of framing and adopting a charter is provided by the I947 Act for
". cities located in counties of between 8i,ooo and 82,000
Since these are the exact
over 200,000 population.... .
words of the Act, this method may be questioned both as
being too vague and as being special legislation.
If the municipality desires to come under Home Rule
and to also retain its old charter,- or if it desires to amend
a charter granted under Home Rule, 21 the question of coming under Home Rule and keeping its old charter or the
proposed amendment may be submitted in the same manner as the question of selection of a charter commission.
The extension of corporate limits may be accomplished
by affirmative vote of the electorate of the municipality and
of the proposed extension, counted separately."0 This election is called by the ordinary at the behest of the municipal
governing body, by ordinance, or by petition of 25% of
the registered voters within the municipality and the pro23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Ga. Laws, 1947, No. 290, § 3 (d), p. 1120; H.B. 25, § 3 (d).
Ibid.
Ga. Laws 1947, No. 290, § 3 (e), pp. 1120, 1121; H.B. 25, § 3 (e).
Ga. Laws 1947, No. 290, § 3 (d), p. 1120; H.B. 25, § 3 (d).
Ga. Laws 1947, No. 290, § 3a, p. 1123.
Ga. Laws 1947, No. 290, § 5, p. 1126; H.B. 25, § 5.
Ga. Laws 1947, No. 290, § 3 (h), p. 1121; H.B. 25, § 3 (b).
Ga. Laws 1947, No. 290, § 3 (k), p. 1121; H.B. 25, § 3 (j).
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posed one of expansion, under the 1947 Act; 3' the proposed
bill changes the alternate method to petition by 20% of the
qualified voters within the area of proposed expansion. 2
This change will doubtless facilitate corporate expansion.
The 1947 Act expressly forbids a municipality having a
population in excess of ioo,ooo and lying in two or more
counties from employing this method to expand its corporate limits in the county or counties in which less than a
majority of its citizens reside.33 The proposed statute removes the taint of special legislation by barring all municipalities lying in two or more counties from using this expansion procedure.
Each statute grants the municipality the following specific
powers in addition to its general power of local legislation :
i. To es'ablish municipal offices and define their powers,
duties and qualifications.
2. To es'ablish and operate waterworks, incinerators, sewerage systems and disposal plants, and electric generating plants
and distributon systems: Provided the municipality may not set
its own rates.
3. To create police courts and maintain police and fire departments.
4. To levy taxes within the limits fixed by i-s charter.
5. To issie, refund, and liquidate financial obligations, including school, street, water, electric generating plant and distribut'on systems, and sewer bonds, and issue revenue anticipaton certificates for the construction of revenue producing facilities. (The proposed statute specifically subjects the issuance of
revenue anticipation certificates to the general law.)
6. To establish hospitals and clinics for both charitable and
paying patients.
7. To own and operate public parks, swimming pools, golf
courses, recreational grounds, air fields and airports.
8. To contract with other political subdivisions for joint
services or exchange of services.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Ga. Laws 1947, No. 290, § 3 (k), p. 1121.
H.B. 25, § 3 (j).
Ga. Laws 1947, No. 290, § 3 (k), pp. 1121, 1122.
H.B. 25, § 3 (j).
Ga. Laws 1947, No. 290, § 4, pp. 1124-1126; H.B. 25, § 4.
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9. To establish merit systems, civil service, and retirement
systems for municipal and school employees.
io. To completely regulate municipal elections.
ii. To grant franchises and contract with public utilities.
(The 1947 Act expressly prohibits the municipality from securing new rights by virtue of this provision, while the proposed
statute merely subjects the exercise of this right to provisions of
the municipal charter and the Constitution and general laws of
the state.)

The 1947 Act grants I, 4, 5, 6, and a portion of 2 of the
above listed powers to all municipalities whether they elect
to come under Home Rule or not. 6 The statute is not clear
as to whether this provision is limited to municipalities eligible to come under Home Rule, but apparently such a limitation was intended.
A provision for recall of officers or members of the governing body of the municipality is included in each statute."
Such recall is held on petition of 25% of the qualified voters
under the 1947 Act and 20% under the proposed bill. Both
limit recall elections to one per officer per year. In the event
of a successful recall election, the office is immediately declared vacant and is then filled in the usual manner. 8
II.
Although almost all Home Rule statutes differ in some
respects, they invariably contain three essentially identical,
basic provisions. These provisions grant to the municipality
the power to draw up its own charter," the right to amend
the charter locally without legislative interference4" and the
right to legislate locally concerning matters of local concern." The exercise of these grants may be subject to regulation, such as a limitation on the number of elections each
year or a requirement that the charter be submitted to the
36. Ga. Laws 1947, No. 290, § 6, p. 1127.

37. Ga. Laws 1947, No. 290, § 7, pp. 1127-1129; H.B. 25, § 6.
38. Ga. Laws 1947, No. 290, § 7 (b), pp. 1128, 1129; H.B. 25, § 6 (b).
39. City of Sapulpa v. Land, 101 Okla. 22, 223 Pac. 640, 35 A.L.R. 872
(1924).
40. People ex rel. Moore v. Perkins, 56 Colo. 17, 137 Pac. 55 (1913).
41. Davidson v. Hine, 151 Mich. 294, 115 N.W. 246 (1908).
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legislature for approval." And such regulation of these
grants must be by a general and not a special law, since the
constitution and the general laws are the only limitations
on Home Rule action.43 In addition to this limitation on the
legislature, adoption of Home Rule renders nugatory all
special acts contrary to the charter adopted" and precludes
the legislature from later passing special acts concerning
matters covered by the act15 or included in the general category known as local matters." Thus the legislature may not
grant a new charter in conflict with the one adopted under
Home Rule." On the other hand, in the absence of an express constitutional provision, the legislature may repeal
the entire Home Rule statute. 8 The effect of such a repeal
on a Home Rule charter has never been determined, but
apparently the charter would then stand subject to legislative change as if originally granted by the legislature. Under a constitutional provision such as Georgia's, the repealing act would probably be held to be invalid unless it also
provided a plan which answered the constitutional mandate.
The most challenging problem under Home Rule statutes
is determination of what is included in the general class
referred to as local affairs. This problem is usually somewhat lessened by a specific enumeration in the statute of
the major powers granted to the municipality, but since the
enumerated powers are broad and since neither the municipality nor the legislature feels bound by the enumeration,
conflict is inevitable. Where both legislate on the same matter and their actions can be reconciled, the courts allow both
to stand unless one clearly invades the domain-of the other.49
42. City of Sapulpa v. Land, 101 Okla, 22, 223 Pac. 640, 35 A.L.R. 872
(1924).
43. City of Denton v. Denton Home Ice Co., 119 Tex. 193, 27 S.W.2d
119, 68 A.L.R. 866 (1930) ; Hudson Motor Car Co. v. Detroit, 228
Mich. 69, 275 N.W. 770, 113 A.L.R. 1472 (1937).
44. Burnes v. Lynn, 49 Okla. 526, 153 Pac. 826 (1915).
45. City of Portland v. Welch, 154 Ore. 286, 59 P.2d 228 (1936).
46. Hudson Motor Car Co. v. Detroit, 228 Mich. 69, 275 N.W. 770, 113
A.L.R. 1472 (1937).
47. Ex Parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Cr. R. 1, 73 S.W. 811 (1903).
48. See Van Gilder v. City of Madison, 222 Wis. 58, 267 N.W. 25
(1936).
49. City of Beaumont v. Fall, 116 Tex. 314, 291 S.W. 202 (1927).
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Thus the legislature has been upheld in regulating the salaries paid by local police departments 0 and in providing
pension plans for local police, 1 because these regulations
of local affairs directly affected law enforcement which is
a matter of statewide concern. Similarly, an attempt to set
up a local fire department was held to be an invasion of the
domain of the local government.," Although the municipality has the power to establish its own parks, the legislature
has been allowed to do the same in providing for the general welfare.53 Where the proposed service is clearly of a
purely local nature, the municipality is still prevented from
engaging in a profit-making enterprise' or a competitive
field

55

without express authority. Consequently, the power

to establish parks cannot be extended by the municipality
so as to enter the commercial field.5
The municipality has the power to determine its own
form of government,57 including the number and types of
officials,"8 but is usually denied the power to establish election procedure59 or to provide methods for contesting elections.6" In one case where the power to establish election

procedure was granted, the extension of suffrage to women,
for city elections, was allowed. 1 The right to extend bound50.

52.

Van Gilder v. City of Madison, 222 Wis. 58, 267 N.W. 25 (1936).
Policemen's Pension Fund v. Schupp, 223 Ky. 269, 3 S.W.2d 606
(1928).
Davidson v. Hine, 151 Mich. 294, 115 N.W. 246 (1908).

53.

Terre Haute v. Kolsum, 130 Ind. 434, 29 N.E. 595 (1891).

54.

City of Denton v. Home Ice Co., 119 Tex. 193, 27 S.W.2d 119
(1930).
Cleveland v. Ruple, 130 Ohio St. 465, 200 N.E. 507 (1936).
Beach Realty Co. v. City of Wildwood, 105 N.J. Law 317, 144 At].
720 (1929).

51.

55.
56.
57.

Booten v. Pinson, 77 W.Va. 412, 89 S.E. 985 (1915).

58. Ibid.
59. Automatic Registering Machine Co. v. Green, 121 Ohio St. 301,
168 N.E. 131 (1929) ; Fitzgerald v. Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 103
N.E. 512 (1930).
60. Fawcett v. Superior Court, 14 Wash. 604, 45 Pac. 23 (1896).
61. State v. French, 96 Ohio St. 172, 117 N.E. 173 (1917).
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aries1 2 and the right to levy taxes, 3 other than those based
on services rendered,"4 do not exist except in accord with the
delegation of authority. Eminent domain is uniformly held
to be a matter of local concern.'3
III.
Both of the statutes considered contain provisions which
place them on a par with any similar statute in the country.
Were the 1947 Act of uniform general application, the
local government problem in Georgia would be greatly
alleviated, but since it lacks this uniform application the
problem remains. Popular demand for a solution is still on
the increase and can be satisfied only by a statute which removes these fatal defects. The logical solution seems to
be enactment of a bill similar to the one recently rejected,
since it is of well-considered substance and meets the legal
requirements of uniform general application.

J. ALVIN GILMORE
SCOTT WALTERS, JR.

62.

State v. Snell, 4 Wash. 773, 31 Pac. 25 (1892) ; Kahn v. Sutro, 114
Cal. 316, 46 Pac. 87 (1896) ; See also Wiget v. City of St. Louis,
337 Mo. 799, 85 S.W.2d 1038 (1935).
63. Kansas City, Mo. v. V. J. J. Case Threshing Machine Co., 337 Mo.
913, 87 S.W.2d 195 (1935).
64. St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 149 U.S. 465, 13 S. Ct.
990, 37 L. Ed. 810 (1892).
65. McMinnville v. Howenstein, 56 Ore. 541, 109 Pac. 81 (1910).

